A Landslide Is a Lease

By Tamuz Itai
Tamuz Itai
Tamuz Itai
Tamuz Itai is a columnist who lives in Tel Aviv, Israel.
November 5, 2026Updated: November 11, 2026

Commentary

History, as the line attributed to Mark Twain has it, does not repeat itself—it rhymes.

On Nov. 3, the rhyme was loud. Democrats took the House, the Senate, and many a governorship, including ground Republicans had treated as safe: Texas, Kansas, Ohio, Iowa, and South Carolina. Early counts pointed to a genuine popular sweep, not a trick of the map.

Some Democrats will want to call the wave a mandate. Some Republicans will want to call it a result of the war, a bad cycle, anything but a contract they are perceived to have failed to keep. Both instincts are how governments die.

Washington seems to be ready to “rhyme” a recent British script, and it is not comforting.

In December 2019, Boris Johnson won the real thing—365 seats in Parliament, 43.6 percent of the vote, and an 80-seat majority—on a short list: Get Brexit done, raise wages, and take back control of the border.

He delivered the exit. He did not deliver the country that was supposed to follow. Net migration, which the manifesto promised to bring down from roughly a quarter of a million, later peaked near 900,000.

Housing was not built. The tax burden headed for a post-war high. “Because COVID” was not convincing long-term. Partygate spent the moral claim; Liz Truss’s 49 days spent the economic one.

By 2024, the right’s own voters had concluded that the party would talk like them and govern like the Treasury. Reform UK took 14.3 percent and five seats. The Conservatives fell to 121.

Labour’s reward looked like 1997 (when Tony Blair won with “New Labour”) but was not. Keir Starmer took 411 seats—about 63 percent of the House—on 33.7 percent of the vote and a turnout below 60 percent, fewer votes than Jeremy Corbyn won while losing in 2019. A Tory collapse and a split on the right manufactured the landslide. It was a repudiation, not a conversion.

Starmer then wasted it without even becoming the radical left. The offer was “change.” Within weeks, the government means-tested the winter fuel payment for millions of pensioners, while senior figures explained donor-funded clothes and glasses. The autumn budget put about 25 billion pounds on employers’ National Insurance and tightened inheritance tax on farms. Growth stayed weak. The boats did not stop. The left peeled off toward the Greens; the borrowed northern seats peeled off the other way.

By late 2025, Starmer’s ratings were the worst Ipsos had recorded for a prime minister since the 1970s. The last nail was about judgment. He sent Peter Mandelson to Washington, knowing of the friendship with Jeffrey Epstein. When the files showed it was worse than advertised, the claim that Mandelson had lied in vetting convinced almost no one.

After a local wipeout in May, Starmer resigned. In July, Labor members of Parliament installed Andy Burnham. The country was not asked for its opinion.

Back to the Nov. 3 wave in America, the early popular-vote counts are a real rebuke: prices, disapproval of the president, a record that asked for patience and spent it. The rhyme is in what comes next. Fail a real mandate, in the eyes of the citizenry, and you are punished. Inherit the punishment, mistake the size of the win for consent, and you can fall faster than the people you replaced. Britain managed both inside of a decade, which is now called there a “lost decade.”

It is important to note here that the UK is a parliamentary system, in which the executive—the government—is born of parliament and not a wholly separate branch. That means that the governing party or coalition can vote to replace the prime minister without triggering a general election.

Also, elections don’t happen only every four years; the prime minister can call them at almost any time, and other mechanisms can do the same. But on the specific issues at hand, I don’t think those differences seriously affect the parallels we are drawing.

What both parties should take from that is plain.

Lessons for America

A large win is a lease. It buys permission to change a short list of things that people can feel: prices, wages, the border, energy, housing, crime, and whether powerful friends are untouchable. It is not a license for the agenda or a trip of vengeance that your activists wanted and the electorate did not vote for.

Voters may indulge an ideology they dislike longer than a number affecting their lives, that was supposed to move but did not. The fatal gap is between the agenda you won on and the statistic you govern with.

The mistakes now on offer are not the same.

In 2024, Republicans had something closer to Johnson than to Starmer: a clear instruction on prices, the border, and competence, from voters who had already fired the other side once. Nov. 3 was the audit. A war and the price of gasoline will be offered as the explanation. They belong in the record, but they are not a substitute for it. If rent and groceries did not move as sold (except for border control, and then ICE’s perceived excesses), the grade is in.

The repair is not a theory of ungrateful voters. It is to close that gap before 2028. Talking right while the lived result goes the other way is worse than an honest case for a milder policy. It vacates the issues, and someone else inherits the office without earning a program.

Democrats hold the opposite risk, and one mercy Britain did not grant Labour. They appear to have won a real popular vote, not a third of the country dressed up as two-thirds of the legislature. They should not spend it recklessly. This wave rejects a governing record; it does not sign a manifesto.

The danger is treating the new majorities as consent for the professional left’s list or opening by burdening the household that just lent them the keys. Starmer lost both flanks because he had no theory of whose side he was on, only of his own coalition. “We will deliver” is the right sentence only if delivery means the cost of ordinary life. If it means donors, advocacy groups, and the staff of the opposition in exile, the rhyme will be exact—and shorter than two years.

Britain’s sequence was a mandate, a failure to execute it, an eviction dressed up as love, and a second eviction of the prime minister by his own party, because no one wanted to face the voters with the record. America is just early in that sequence, not immune to it. The party that treats Nov. 3 as an instruction to do a few hard, measurable things will be the one still standing come 2028. The party that treats it as vengeance or absolution will have the next rhyme read right back to it.

Views expressed in this article are the opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Epoch Times.